The Premise
The global maritime order relies on a single mechanism of enforcement: Marine Insurance. If a ship cannot get P&I (Protection & Indemnity) cover, it technically cannot sail. However, a parallel "Shadow Fleet" has emerged that operates outside this consensus, effectively creating an unregulated "Oceanic Dark Web" where G7 sanctions do not apply and environmental liability does not exist.
Intelligence Update: The Shadow Fleet
The Shadow Fleet is no longer a fringe operation; it is a systemic competitor to the regulated market.
The Scale: As of 2025, maritime AI firm Windward identifies approximately 1,100 vessels in the high-risk "Dark Fleet." This represents nearly 10% of the global large tanker fleet.
The Deception: 29% of this fleet is now sailing under false or fraudulent flags (e.g., Eswatini, Cameroon), masking their identity to bypass port controls.
The Volume: Despite the G7 Price Cap, these vessels continue to move millions of barrels of Russian and Iranian crude daily, effectively nullifying the "Energy Weapon" of the West.
Field Evidence: The Regulatory Failure
The "Ghost Ship" risk is not just financial; it is physical.
Date: May 2023
The MT Pablo, a Gabon-registered Aframax tanker, exploded off the coast of Malaysia, tearing the deck apart and leaving 3 crew missing. The ship was part of the Dark Fleet, moving Iranian oil. It had no known insurer.
The Lesson: When a Shadow Fleet vessel explodes, there is no one to call. The cleanup cost and liability fall 100% on the coastal state. It is a "sovereign liability bomb" waiting to drift into a port.
Date: 2024–2025
After Greece intensified naval exercises in the Laconian Gulf to deter Ship-to-Ship transfers, the Shadow Fleet simply moved. Transfers of Russian oil shifted to international waters off Chios and Lesbos, outside the 6-mile territorial limit.
The Lesson: You cannot sanction the ocean. Static naval blockades fail against a mobile, fluid adversary.
Date: Early 2026
Under pressure from Brussels, Cameroon pledged to deregister its entire Shadow Fleet registry. The vessels did not stop sailing; they simply bought new flags from other Flags of Convenience (e.g., Palau, Cook Islands) within 48 hours.
The Lesson: The barrier to entry for a "Sovereign Flag" is a credit card payment, not a safety inspection.
The Sovereignty Paradox
For Supply Chain Directors, the risk is Contamination.
The Fuel Risk: If your logistics provider bunkers their vessel with fuel from a "Shadow Mix" (blended Russian diesel), your entire supply chain is technically in breach of OFAC sanctions.
The Rescue Risk: If a Shadow Tanker loses power in the Suez Canal (a frequent occurrence due to average vessel age >18 years), your legitimate cargo gets blocked behind it.
Tactical Mitigation
AIS Gap Analysis: Do not trust the Bill of Lading. Mandate "Continuous AIS" verification. Any vessel with >2 hours of "Dark Activity" in a high-risk zone is disqualified.
The "Blue Card" Audit: Demand to see the actual P&I Certificate of Entry. If it is not from an International Group club (e.g., Gard, Britannia, Skuld), the vessel is a risk.
Port Diversification: Avoid hubs heavily congested by Shadow Traffic (e.g., Singapore Strait anchorages) where collision risk is statistically higher.
The Verdict
The Ghost Fleet is not going away; it is institutionalising. If you are not actively screening the vessel (not just the owner), you are arguably complicit in the evasion you claim to oppose.